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The current Marine Corps tactical intelligence
information flow at battalion level is hierarchal in nature,
and structured in design and syntax. It is completed
manually using a checklist approach to ensure adequate
control of the data flows. This thesis investigates the
issues in developing and implementing an automated expert
system for collecting and disseminating tactical
intelligence, using commercially available systems.
Background, system objectives and an Integrated Knowledge
Based System and Database Management System structure are
discussed. Knowledge acquisition and revision through end-
user computing using an off-the-shelf expert system are
emphasized. A system requirements review is conducted to
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The ability to collect and organize data into useful
information has grown dramatically in the past few years,
largely due to technological advances in artificial
intelligence applied to expert systems, database management
systems and programming techniques. This quantitative leap
in capability has made combat information and intelligence
potentially available to every Commander and small unit leader
who has authorized access and can manipulate the voluminous
data. However, to exploit this capability, a means to
correlate information so that it can become useful for
tactical decision making is required. Essential elements of
information must be parsed from the larger body of
information, disseminated quickly, and presented in a manner
that the user can understand. Additionally, as the user gains
more knowledge about the problem and becomes familiar with the
system, more detailed information must be made available to
him upon request. As more information becomes available in
a shorter period, the issue of an integrated information
system becomes increasingly important. The author believes
research reveals little application of this science has been
made at the lower tactical levels of the military in support
of the intelligence cycle; that is, collecting, evaluating,
processing and disseminating information, for which Artificial
Intelligence (AI ) technology can be applied.
Governmental sponsorship has spurred enthusiasm in
Artificial Intelligence in general, and has generated an avid
interest into exploiting AI techniques for future information
systems (RADC, 1986, p. 1-2) . The potential to enhance
current information processing systems with AI techniques is
recognized. When the information system contains processes
that aid the user in using information through active
knowledge processing, it is called an integrated information
system. Integrated systems consist of one or more databases
managed by a database management system, and a knowledge base
and knowledge base system to support deduction, explanation
and presentation of information. (RADC, 1986, p. 1-2)
The current tactical intelligence flow is largely
hierarchal in nature, and is structured in design and syntax
(message formats) . Disseminating a piece of information is
a function of control and strict adherence to procedures
rather than that of timeliness and relevance. Manually
passing information between a number of command layers
necessarily carries with it the inherent risk of miscue due
to human error.
Additionally, manually collecting and disseminating
tactical intelligence is burdensome on the scarce resources
of personnel in the Marine Corps. An automated system that
can draw correct inferences from voluminous, frequently-
changing data, and relay only what is relevant to those
Commanders who need it, implies the reduction of staff work
and replacement of non-essential personnel. Consider the
conceptual model of an integrated, information system
comprised of databases, other expert systems, and decision
support systems. A system that can tap into those other
systems, control those other systems and act as a metasystem,
extract pertinent detail, and then pass this information to
Commanders on a need-to-know, real-time basis, implies a
better, more productive system than is currently in place.
Note, however, no tactical decisions are made. In the
extreme, only courses of action are presented.
The present methods of performing certain functions within
the battalion Combat Operations Center (COC) are extremely
labor intensive and costly in terms of opportunity-lost
because of the inordinate amount of time spent on
recordkeeping, database management, and dissemination. The
sheer volume of message traffic, which requires logging,
formatting and transmitting, requires the maintenance
(currently by manual methods) of a large, frequently changing
database, which takes an enormous portion of the analyst's
time. Thus, the analyst is unable to spend more time in
qualitative analysis expected of him in addition to his
recordkeeping tasks. This, in turn, affects the recipients
of the message traffic. Procedures are closely adhered to in
an attempt to ensure message traffic arrives at the intended
destinations. The process handles messages on a first in,
last out priority, without regard to message content.
Optimizing the processes of evaluation and dissemination would
result in the availability of more accurate and pertinent
information in a more timely manner. Automation of the
repetitive, structured tasks of the analyst will provide the
means to ensure current message and situation databases,
efficient and timely dissemination of critical information
contained within messages, and an extensive and effective
knowledge base to aid the analyst in his decision-making.
Consider an automated tactical intelligence information
system that can fully perform the duties of the infantry
battalion Intelligence Officer with respect to collecting
information from the line companies, sensor input and other
collection agencies; then evaluate the content for
intelligence value, analyze the intelligence, and disseminate
to designated units only that information which is pertinent
to them. Such a task is very complex in that it relies on the
abilities of the Intelligence Officer. Yet, it is a largely
structured environment in which the task is accomplished. By
carefully evaluating the content of the received messages from
the collection agency, or source, further conclusions are
reached based on the facts contained within the messages and
facts already stored in a database.
B . SCOPE
The focus of this thesis is a system requirements review
of an integrated information system that automates those tasks
of the Intelligence Officer and messengers/radio operators in
the battalion COC, and provides intelligence to Commanders
down to company level. Research is specifically intended to
model a system that will extract facts from databases, query
an expert system using those facts, and then combine all
gathered facts, rules and conclusions together to arrive at
a goal intended to either: (1) provide tactical intelligence
to those who request it, (2) disseminate information contained
in messages to those who require it, (3) add and subtract
rules and facts within the database and knowledge base.
Research will cover both the expert system methodologies
and a database architecture which are appropriate in designing
an integrated intelligence expert system, to include the




Determine the system requirements for an integrated
information system that:
- receives and stores incoming messages,
- detects critical information within incoming messages,
- disseminates information to appropriate recipients,
- provides on-line queries for intelligence for users
2. Demonstrate the potential of computers to aid company
Battalion Commanders to send and receive messages.
3. Highlight problem areas development implementing such
a system for use in a combat organization.
4. Determine the feasibility of the application of
Artificial Intelligence techniques to the automation of
certain intelligence functions and message dissemination
within the battalion COC
.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Identify the system requirements for an integrated
information system. Functional areas identified include the
metasystem knowledge base and discussion of interconnectivity
with a cooperating knowledge base and a database.
2. What are the appropriate limits of the domain that
the system should be expected to possess; that is, who should
be the users of the system?
3. Can a single system be built that can effectively and
efficiently perform message handling capabilities and capture
the role of the intelligence analyst with respect to low level
information evaluation, to such a degree that automation can
be implemented to significantly aid the Commander, the
analyst, and company commands?
4. Where are the design issues to be addressed in
modelling the proposed system?
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Knowledge acquisition obtained for background theory was
gathered primarily from government contracts and academic
publications. The doctrinal and operational knowledge was
gained from doctrinal publications and through interviews of
Intelligence Specialists and officers from the First Marine
Division. The model desion has been heuristic.
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. Intelligence Specialists presently cannot complete
all their required tasks given the demands placed upon them
and the constraints under which they operate.
2. Eliminating the reliance on radio operators in sending
and receiving messages is the focus of concern for the
intended users of the proposed system.
3. An integrated system is capable of performing all




An integrated information system of this scope
requires an incremental approach to implementation. A
prototype is necessary in an early stage of development to
ensure users requirements are fulfilled.
5. Each battalion has its own standard operating
procedures which are unique to that unit. The appropriateness
of an expert system in a combat environment and using untested
technology with essentially computer-untrained personnel will
require further effort.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized into four major sections,
excluding the introduction and conclusions. Marine Corps
intelligence considerations provides the background as to why
8
an automated system is needed, and what it should accomplish,
from the operational viewpoint of an infantry battalion. The
mindset is that the needs of combat dictates the use of
technology. The scope of the thesis remains narrow, confined
to the needs of the Company Commanders, Battalion Intelligence
Specialists, and the Operations Officer of the Battalion. The
second major section explains the technology applied within
the system. The integrated information system functional
areas and design considerations are presented. The third
section lists the systems requirements. This, of course, is
the basis for the application of the technology mapped onto
the problem as presented in the previous two sections . It
should provide the reader with an understanding as to how the
model will appear. The fourth major section builds upon
primarily the last, but utilizes all the preceding sections
data to diagrammatically present a system model. Conclusions
are drawn and recommendations for further model refinement are
presented, along with some of the implications of
implementation of this system.
II. MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS
A. GENERAL
This chapter presents the problem definition for this
thesis. Information containing the organization of the Marine
Corps, functions of the intelligence cycle, and duties and
responsibilities of the Intelligence Officer are presented
first. The operation of a battalion combat operations center
(COC) is explained from the perspective of the Intelligence
Specialist. A limited amount of information is included to
allow the thesis effort to remain focused and give the reader
a better understanding of the scope and complexity of the




An understanding of the intelligence cycle is crucial to
determining what the system seeks to do in aiding Intelligence
Specialists and Commanders. Marine Corps doctrine explains
intelligence in terms of four phases that are cyclic in
nature. This, then, is translated into the intelligence cycle
that provides the framework for the integrated information
system.
10
The intelligence cycle consists of directing, collecting,




Collection refers to obtaining data from any source.
Retrieval of intelligence, then, is the focus for collecting
information. Information is retrieved from collection
agencies by means of tactical reports. Information may or
may not arrive simultaneously. It may not even be pertinent,
or it may only be partially useful. Accurate and timely
retrieval of information is the first function of the
intelligence component that must be performed.
"Infantry units collect information because of its
combat role of closing with the enemy. Infantry may fight to
obtain information, or any information by scouting and
patrolling...." (FMFM 2-1, 1980, p. 5-9) Information is
furnished to the intelligence section within the COC
concerning enemy strength, disposition, location,
identification, attitude and fighting capabilities. First-
hand, up-to-date information on the characteristics of the
area of operations is then provided to the field units. The
close relationship between the field units and Intelligence
Officer is evident: The Intelligence Officer retrieves
11
collected information from field units via reports. He must
then process these newfound facts and may be called upon to
draw inferences or pass some of these facts to other
interested agencies.
2 . Processing
Processing consists of converting information into
intelligence and is broken down into the following steps:
"a. Recording information systematically for ease
of study and comparison.
b. Evaluating information as to pertinence,
reliability of source, and accuracy.
c. Analyzing information is isolate significant
elements with respect to the mission and the operations of
the command.
d. Integrating information to combine elements
isolated in analysis with other known information to form a
logical picture of hypothesis of enemy activities which might
influence the mission of the command.
e. Interpreting information to form logical
conclusions which can serve as a basis for determining the
effects on the current intelligence estimate." (FMFM 2-1,
1980, p. 7-1)
12
The purpose of recording is twofold: (1) Facilitate
further processing and dissemination, and (2) provide a
record of events for further study and analysis (FMFM 2-1,
1980, p. 7-1) . Information is captured on the enemy situation
map, the intelligence journal, intelligence worksheets and
other like media.
When evaluating information, the Intelligence Officer
determines its pertinence and accuracy. Evaluation is
accomplished concurrently with recording. Information which
is not pertinent is not processed further (FMFM 2-1, 1980,
p. 7-6). Urgent information is disseminated immediately to
those agencies who have a real-time need for it. Accuracy is
a function of source reliability and historical consistency.
It is dependent upon the Intelligence Officer's experience and
biases, for he singularly determines accuracy based on logic
and interpretation. Also, as a result of the necessity for
information to be passed through echelons of command to the
Intelligence Officer, severe degradation of intelligence
evaluation can occur. The information is then useless.
After evaluating information and determining whether
there is a need to immediately notify others who may need it,
the Intelligence Officer refines his evaluation through
analysis. "Analysis is the sifting and sorting of evaluated
13
information to isolate significant elements with respect to
the mission and operations of the command." (FMFM 2-1, 1980,
p. 7-8) Clearly, analysis requires expertise. A thorough
knowledge of the enemy situation and principles of military
operations is required. An exhaustive analysis can only be
completed by referring to the appropriate references that
detail enemy order of battle and situation. Additionally,
recent experience vis-a-vis a historical base is referenced
to obtain present intentions
.
The analysis of the incoming information is integrated
with other known information to form a logical picture of
hypothesis of enemy activities and other influences (FMFM 2-
1, 1980, p. 7-8) on the mission. Integration at battalion
level is limited to available resources (usually publications
and messages/notes from higher headquarters) and the level of
expertise of the Intelligence Officer. Expanding his
knowledge base of how and where to obtain additional facts
increases his integration capability and results in
significantly better judgmental interpretations of the
information. The Intelligence Officer at this level can
access databases/knowledge bases only when he knows where to
look, what to look for, and the references/sources are at his
disposal. "Points of indecision frequently arise when
14
individuals lack information, when they overlook what they do
know, when they cannot locate information they need, and when
they are unclear about particular issues." (Nunamaker, et
al
.
, 1988, p. 26) Therefore, omission and commission errors
from biases occur in his database.
Processing information then, as long as the tasks
remain clearly defined and are narrow in scope, can be
automated. The issues of processing are timeliness, accuracy,
and relevance. The tasks of processing; that is, recording,
evaluating, analyzing, integrating, and interpreting, are
largely structured. They are based on a clearly, albeit
complex and uniquely defined set of rules. Capturing these
rules in an expert system appears to be technologically
feasible. The proposed system must integrate the defined
functions of the intelligence activities. It must perform the
same operations as the Intelligence Officer, but with better
answers in shorter time and with greater consistency.
3 . Dissemination
The last phase discussed is dissemination.
Dissemination is the conveyance of intelligence in suitable






- Security (FMFM 2-1, 1980, p. 8-1) .
a. Timeliness
Certain items of information must be given to the
affected unit(s) in time so they can adequately react. The
immediate significance of such information, such as the case
of an impending air attack is obvious. (FMFM 2-1, 1980, p.
8-1) There may not be time enough to complete processing
prior to dissemination. A situation evaluated as an urgency
must be handled with extreme speed and efficiency. However,
the urgency of the situation must first be recognized.
Jb. Usability of Form
Intelligence must be in a form which is easily
understandable to the recipient. There can be no margin for
misinterpretation/misunderstanding of the content of the
communicated information. "Urgent information and
intelligence should be disseminated in the form of brief
messages, devoid of any nonessential details, to permit its




Units should not receive information for which
they have no use. Additionally, useful information should
only be received as needed. The doctrinal guideline states
that dissemination downward should be selective, based upon
the usefulness of the information to the intended recipient
(FMFM 2-1, 1980, p. 8-2) . Nearly all intelligence should be
disseminated upward (FMFM 2-1, 1980, p. 8-2) . Here an
inherent weakness surfaces with the present mode of
information dissemination. Unnecessarily long delays in
communicating urgent information can result if the affected
units are outside the immediate chain of command of the
collection agency. There may exist a need to expeditiously
pass combat information from the collector to the user,
bypassing normal chain of command channels (FMFM 2-1, 1980,
p. 8-2) . Currently, unneeded information is passed with the
useful intelligence due to the rigid structure of message
formats. An automated system can react faster and with
greater efficiency that can multiple layers of command
involvement that adhere to standard message formats with all
lines filled in and passed. Threshold criteria to determine
usefulness of information is structured to a large degree.
17
d. Security
Security is one of the most important
considerations in developing any tactical system that conveys
information. Disclosure of certain information, albeit
unintentional or unknown, to the enemy may render the
intelligence (and further intelligence efforts) useless.
However, urgent tactical messages of local significance may
be sent in the clear (FMFM 2-1, 1980, p. 8-2)
.
C. SYSTEM DOMAIN
With this doctrinal model defined, the system domain is
specified. It must be limited to a narrow scope in order for
an expert system to be implemented. Therefore, only
standardized messages will be represented; passed from a lower
level to a higher level, and to an adjacent, or peer level.
This model works for any and all intelligence collected in the
manner discussed. Applying it to other more complex tasks of
the battalion Intelligence Officer is possible insofar as
those tasks are structured. However, for the purpose of this
prototype, discussion in these areas will be limited to black-
box references
.
The expert system developed must emulate the intelligence
cycle model shown. System simplicity and flexibility is
attained through modularization and independence of duties
18
that the system provides. The brain of the system is the
metasystem, described in detail in a later section, which
serves as the "traffic-controller". Incoming information is
collected and evaluated. Based on this immediate evaluation,
several options are available to the metasystem: (1)
Information immediately passed on to those units requiring it.
Information of this type is limited to urgent and time
considerations over-rule other needs, (2) Information is
processed in detail. Analysis, integration and interpretation
are performed by a module not considered as the metasystem.
The intelligence is then passed back to the metasystem for
dissemination, (3) Information is discarded as not pertinent,
(4) The system determines that the incoming information does
not logically couple with its historical knowledge base and
database. It would be necessary for the operator to control
further action from this point. The metasystem passes control
to a module specifically built to handle the options available
upon evaluation. If it is necessary to immediately pass the
information to units who have an urgent need for it, the
module determines who needs it and the metasystem sends it.
Likewise, if the information is to be analyzed, then that
module takes control. Each module is partitioned so that each
is independent of the information in another module to the
19
maximum extent possible. If a module needs more information,
it solicits additional information from that module only as
needed. The metasystem is responsible for determining where
next to send the information based upon the content of that
information
.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE MARINE INFANTRY BATTALION COC
A Marine Infantry Battalion is organized into line
companies and a headquarters and service company, plus
attachments as necessary. The line companies perform the
actual combat duties as assigned by battalion headquarters.
Headquarters consists of the Commanding Officer (CO) and his
staff, which assist him in leading the battalion.
The CO of the battalion controls and commands his combat
units primarily through the operation of a command post. The
command post is called the battalion combat operations center,
or COC. Though the exact organization and placement of
personnel within the COC may vary from command to command, all
COCs normally house at least the Operations Officer, the Fire
Support Coordinator and the Intelligence Officer as principle
staff officers. Information provided to the Commander by the
staff includes information concerning the friendly situation,
plotted on a map or overlay; information on the enemy
situation, plotted on a different overlay; and information
20
concerning fire support and targeting on yet another overlay.
Information on these status boards are updated as frequently
as the situation dictates and time allows. The Intelligence
Officer's specific duties and responsibilities are outlined
in the following section. All processing is accomplished by
manual methods; an incoming message is received, recorded,
logged, and passed on to all the major agencies, including the
Watch Officer within the COC for further processing. Each
agency then logs the message (each in a separate log) and
takes action as appropriate, documenting their action taken.
Among the staff agencies who take action is the intelligence
section, headed by the Intelligence Officer. He is
responsible for directing certain intelligence activities.
In order to perform some of his duties, he relies on facts,
reported in the form of standardized messages, from line
companies and other collection agencies.
E. DUTIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.
The Intelligence Officer advises and assists the
commanding officer. In so doing, he is responsible for
directing the following intelliaence activities:
" (a) The direction, collection, production, and
dissemination of detailed, accurate and timely combat
intelligence required by members of the command to arrive at
21
decisions, conduct planning, execute maneuvers, and avoid
surprised.
(b) The direction, collection, production, and
dissemination of intelligence as directed by higher
headquarters
.
(c) The direction, collection, production, and
dissemination of intelligence to other interested Commanders
consistent with the operational requirements of the command."
(FMFM 2-1, 1980, p. 1-2)
Note that collecting and disseminating are command points
within each activity. Further refinement of specifying the
Intelligence Officer' s specific responsibilities indicates he
produces intelligence by processing data into useful
information. In using this information and subsequently
delivering the final product of intelligence, he must: (1)
estimate the effects of terrain and weather (and other
factors) on friendly and enemy courses of action, (2) estimate
enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, including the courses
of action he is most likely to adopt, (3) prepare studies and
reports for the enemy order of battle and enemy weapons,
tactics, techniques, and equipment (FMFM 2-1,1980, p. 1-33).
Many of the battalion Intelligence Officer's tasks are
performed within a COC . He must keep the Commanding Officer,
22
staff, and other interested agencies informed of the
characteristics of the objective area and the enemy situation.
He completes his responsibilities with the aid of a number of
enlisted marines who serve as radio operators, messengers and
Intelligence Specialists.
The Intelligence Specialists perform all the record-
keeping tasks, audit trails, and database management duties.
In the absence of the Intelligence Officer, they are called
upon to offer conclusions or state facts on the enemy's
capabilities and situation. They manually maintain sufficient
documentation in the form of the intelligence journal,
workbook, and other notes, to perform their duties.
Information maintained in the intelligence journal includes:
time in (journal)
file (for audit purposes)
date-time-group of message
description
action taken, available choices are map, staff, troops,
(file)
Additionally, the intelligence workbook contains the same
information, except in greater detail and it includes enemy
order of battle and enemy action. All messages are entered
into the journal and everything is always filed for auditing
purposes. Over a 12-hour period of a tactical exercise, an
23
estimated 50-75 messages may arrive for action by the
intelligence section within the COC . It is important to
remember that the intelligence section is also responsible
for the enemy situation plot and for providing the Commander




III. FOUNDATION FOR INTEGRATED INFORMATION SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND
This chapter discusses the concepts of a knowledge based
system (KBS) and the concept of a particular type of database
management system (DBMS), and their integration. Within the
confines of a KBS the metasystem concept is explained, which
is an intended focus of this thesis.
Critical complexities exist in the design and development
of integrated information systems possessing knowledge
processing abilities. In-place systems have evolved through
the consolidation of existing technology (RADC 86, 1986, p.
1-3)
. Knowledge representation and processing concepts have
been integrated with capabilities from database management.
Key to integration is the intended use of that system. The
issue is determining what technology will drive the system:
Will it be a DBMS with knowledge processing capabilities, or
will it be a KBS with a database management scheme? The
approach of this thesis asserts that the expert system will
be the vehicle for information decisionmaking, problem
solving, and normal user interface; and that the database
management system is the vehicle for data manipulation,
25
storage, retrieval, and security. To invoke the database
manager, the end-user informs the KBS to perform the command.
The KBS metasystem (defined later) passes control of the
system to the DBMS, until a specified command is called, which
of course, re-invokes the KBS. It is the metasystem, then
that drives this integrated information system.
B. INTEGRATION ISSUE
The integration of a KES and DBMS is a combining of their
respective design and implementation elements and features
into a single functional unit (RADC 86, 1986, p. 5-4). This
definition uncovers the concern for the KBS to be able to use
the DBMS, or the DBMS to use the knowledge base effectively.
Does integration imply that the rule-base must exist within
the database? This design integration consideration is only
one example of many questions raised by the term "structural
unity" of the definition.
An alternative approach is to address functional unity.
Allow the KBS to import the DBMS implementation (for this
system) but retain system control within the KBS. Is this
true integration, or merely an interface issue? It is beyond
the scope of this thesis to examine the issue of true
structural integration: the issue of this system is
functionality. Therefore, functional unity is assumed to
26
fulfill the requirements to label this proposed system an
integrated information system.
C. KBS
Traditional programming techniques lack the necessary
flexibility to deal efficiently with incomplete information
and multiple solutions (ULTRA, 1987) . Knowledge-based systems
were designed to solve problems which are abstract and
substantially more difficult (RADC 86, 1986, p. 2-6) . KBSs
infer, compare, combine and reason (RADC 86, 1986, p. 2-11)
to make decisions for which it was intended. The most
important goal for an expert system is to attain the high
level of performance that the human expert achieves in that
task (Hayes-Roth, Waterman, and Lenat, 1983, p. 43) . Expert
systems must successfully solve the problems for which they
are designed to solve. To be successful, the way in which
the correct answer is reached is important. Blindly searching
through large numbers of hypotheses should be avoided;
instead, the KBS should have the ability to recognize patterns
and jump quickly to reasonable conclusions (Hayes-Roth, et
al
.
, 1983, p. 44). This section discusses the application of
expert system methodologies for the KBS-module of the
integrated information system. Further, analysis is limited
to the meta-rules of the KBS.
27
An expert system is a computer program that captures the
expertise of one or more experts in some domain and applies
this knowledge to make useful inferences (Hayes-Roth, et al
.
,
1983, p. 168) . Moreover, it has a number of characteristics:
- It applies expert rules in an efficient manner in order
to reach acceptable solutions.
- It bases its reasoning process on symbol manipulation.
- Basic principles of the domain reside within the
knowledge-base. It must be capable of reasoning about
its own knowledge and also of reconstructing inference
paths for explanation and justification.
- It must be able to re-formulate the problem (Hayes-Roth,
et al., 1983, pp. 169-171). To reformat the problem, it
must be able to infer new facts from what it has already
been told.
The knowledge-based system is compartmentalized according
to the specific function for which it is intended. Each
compartmentalized section is comprised of the rules intended
to accomplish its calls of tasks, all interconnected and
controlled by the metasystem. The compartmentalized knowledge
base (exclusive of the metasystem) performs the following
tasks
:
- Check each incoming message for consistency. Consistency
is measured in terms of context (message type) and
content. The information in each message is represented
by objects that are checked to see if indeed that object
can exist in the manner expressed.
- Check each accepted message object for urgency. If the
object is regarded as life-threatening or time-critical,




- Route each messaae. Rules check each object and
appropriately disseminate those objects to intended
recipients
.
- Provide solutions to user-queries.
Expert system methodologies applied to these functions will
not be explored further.
D . METASYSTEM
The metasystem is the focal point of this thesis and
performs the important tasks of providing strategies about
selecting rules, conflict resolution, and parameter passing
between compartmentalized rules and external databases.
Supplying knowledge about the knowledge in the system improves
the performance of that system. The metasystem contains
reliable by time-varying data and knowledge, and is likely to
have a relatively small solution space. The prescriptive
methodologies to be applied to these requirements may include
exhaustive search techniques, monotonic reasoning and state-
triggered expectations (Hayes-Roth et al
.
, 1983, p. 91).
In a metasystem, the application domain is the system
itself. The rules about rules are metarules and the
inferencing process is metareasoning (Zytkow and Erickson,
1987, pp. 115-121) . To perform metareasoning, it follows that
the knowledge in the knowledge base must describe the system
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in terms of meta representation. This metaknowledge is the




It is difficult, and perhaps not necessary for humans to
remain abreast of everything that is happening internally
within the system, and to concentrate on performing their
intuitive tasks. The metasystem is designed to remain abreast
of everything that is happening internally within the system.
The program itself must document, justify, modify and
understand itself (Hayes-Roth et al
.
, 1983, p. 221).
To be robust, the metasystem must be capable of performing
certain functions
:
- Select rules. There are several compartmentalized rule-
bases which need to be called upon. There must exist
rules that determine when to call upon those rules.
- Resolve conflicts. Where more than one rule can be
appropriately applied, and the resulting hypotheses
differ, there is conflict. Choosing among the many rules
that may be relevant at any given moment requires
additional rules
.
- Maintain facts about the system. Metarules cannot
function unless record-keeping of previously used rules,
and the new facts that they may have generated, are
maintained. Data from this record-keeping is called
empirically obtained resource data.
- Justify rules. A complete trace of the line of reasoning
may be appropriate in complex decision-making scenarios.
- Detect bugs in rules. Rules that have conclusions that
can never be met (syntactic errors), or hypotheses that
are not realistic (semantic errors) can be detected by
the metarules.
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- Provides for program d^sion. Descriptive metaknowledge
on interrelations that should exist in the knowledge are
used to provide semantic checks of newly acquired
knowledge it may have generated. The metaknowledge shows
how rules interrelate.
- Justifies program architecture. Users may ask why one
rule was picked over another, or why a rule was not
considered at all . Having an expert system handle these
types of queries calls for knowledge about the
consistency, completeness and magnitude of the knowledge,
the size and composition of the search space, and other
systemic parameters
.
- Aid the system to perform better. Metarules can exist
to allow the system to reconfigure itself in response
to experience.
- Model the program's abilities. The metarules instruct
the program about its limitations and appropriate
functions. Metarules ensure that the program does not
provide solutions for problems it is not capable of
answering. (Hayes-Roth et al
.
, 1983, pp. 223-234)
E . DBMS
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present a
comprehensive DBMS overview for implementation within the
integrated information system. A separate, complete
requirement' s analysis concerning database management is
required. However, to appreciate the fundamental requirements
of the system' s database scheme and understand the complexity
of the use of integration of the database with the KBS, a
discussion of a potential database management system is
briefly discussed.
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A database management system is a collection of
interrelated data and a set of programs to access that data.
(Korth and Silbershatz, 1986, p. 16) Its primary goal is to
provide an environment that is both convenient and efficient
to use in retrieving and storing information to the database
itself. In pursuance of this goal, it should provide users
with an abstract view of the data. That is, the details of
how the data is stored and maintained is hidden. To be
convenient and efficient, a DBMS used in this system model
should focus on the end-user and the capabilities it should
contribute to the integrated information system. Three
important issues to be addressed are: power, presenting
information in a way that is useful to the users, and
performance. Selecting an appropriate DBMS to score high on
these points is important for the successful exploitation of
the potential of an integrated system. Traditional database
systems, albeit powerful, flexible and perhaps user-friendly,
lack an important precept that must be a driving force for
those who seek information while in combat: speed and ease
of data retrieval coupled with its contribution to the power
of the integrated system.
The system should not dictate, due to its limitations,
how it will present the data on the screen. Instead, all
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users, even those who are not sure what answer (s) they are
looking for, should be guided though the information quickly,
viewing only what is essential in a form they are most
comfortable with. Without comparison of traditional
databases, a new database scheme is offered: Hypertext. With
the assumption that all system components should be "off-the-
shelf" nondevelopmental systems, a hypertext system may be a
solution for field use, intended to operate with a cooperative
KBS.
Hypertext is a DBMS that allows you to connect nodes of
information using associative links (Fiderio, 1988, p. 238).
It mimics a person' s ability to access information quickly
and intuitively by reference. Information is parsed into
small, syntactically discrete units called nodes, which
consist of a single concept or idea. Links are used to
connect the nodes. By embedding them in text or by separate
reference, you are connected to associated or ancillary
information. Links, then, are the mode of transportation in
a hypertext network. (Fiderio, 1988, pp. 238-249) They can
help define the node's relationship to other nodes within the




By design, hypertext is a browsing, or perusing tool.
Its power lies in the links. A graphical browser (Fiderio,
1988, p. 240) allows you to skip through the database and move
directly to an area you are interested in, even though you may
not know exactly what you are looking for. A viewing filter
(Fiderio, 1988, p. 240) suppresses detail and allows the user
to view only that which he desires. Virtual structures change
dynamically when you add or delete nodes and links, depending
on their description. Virtual structures are similar to
relational database views (Fiderio, 1988, p. 244). Links can
be generated by text parsers or by user-definition. For
example, a parsed message with one of its objects being
POSITION, places the association between the nodes UNIT and
POSITION. Further, if the unit is an antitank unit, an
associative link would be placed between ANTITANK_UNIT, UNIT,
and POSITION.
The DBMS will be called upon in three instances:
- The owner of the database, the Intelligence Specialist,
makes changes to one of the databases he has privileges
to modify.
- Users of the database request information from the DBMS.
Based on the request code, the system lets the user query
the DBMS direct for information he is authorized to have.
A Platoon Commander, in reading for a patrol, may wish to
have a real-time update on terrain and weather, known
enemy positions in his area, and other pertinent facts.
By using a query-construction window (Begeman and
Conklin, 1988, p. 262), the DBMS searches for the detail
of data this platoon command would likely desire. For
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example, a Platoon Commander is not likely to want to
view division-level data. Additionally, embedded links
would let the Platoon Commander know if there is
additional or related information. By highlighting the
text with cursor movement, the Platoon Commander
retrieves additional information in the detail he
desires
.
- The system's knowledge-bases call upon the databases for
facts to use with their rules. All incoming messages
must first be checked for consistency and urgency.
Consistency checks ensure data integrity and concurrency
within the database, as well as eliminating redundancy.
For example, an instance of message object TIME would be
checked to see: (1) if that message is timely. A
message, even though just sent, that contains a suspect
TIME would potentially disrupt data updates; (2) if the
additional information is plausible. The TIME instance
of this would be message checked against another time or
time-interval or other known facts; (3) if that TIME
instance could be the TIME instance of a duplicate
message, sent by another unit, with the same information.
To perform these routine checks, the rules concerning
consistency and urgency are called upon, and the metasystem
system calls upon the database manager to provide those rules
with the knowledge, or facts stored in the database.
F. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES.
The organization of the KBS and the data structure of the
DBMS must not only be compatible, but cooperative to the
extent that it combines to form a robust system. Similar
organization structures facilities integration and allow the
domain expert to directly interface with both systems with
minimal confusion.
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The KBS should be object oriented such as with Neuron
Data's NEXPERT, an expert systemshell. In it, an object has
a name and belongs to a class. It is a discrete unit which
consists of a single concept or idea, and has a series of
properties that describe its qualities. It also has
subobjects which constitute its components. For each class,
object and subobjects, relations are defined. With such a
structure, the real-world can be represented with the
hierarchical descriptions. The KBS, then, can reason at the
class level, object level, or component (subobject) level.
The DBMS should be likewise organized; that is, similarly
organized. Hypertext nodes correspond to the objects of the
KBS. Hypertext links correspond to the objects' properties
of the KBS. However, it is the node-object similarity that
is important. Similar organization can lead to a fuller, more
robust integration.
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
The tactical intelligence integrated information system's
required capabilities can be implemented using seven major
functional areas. These functional areas, with the exception
of the database manager and security, are the major components
of the KBS
.
Within each of these components, it is the
metasystem that provides the links between each functional
area. The Intelligence Specialist (operator) Interface
provides the man-machine interface. The Intelligence
Specialist is the "owner" of the system, and the interface
allows the owner to control the KBS, or intervene in any of
the functions of the KBS. The Security functional area
provides the rules within the KBS that delineate those further
system actions (by external routines or programs) that are
taken in the event that the KBS or DBMS has detected
unauthorized intrusion. Security in this sense is limited
to the data and knowledge security of the DBMS and KBS. A
more detailed discussion of computer security issues are
contained in Appendix A. The Message Receive and Filter
functional component receives incoming messages in standard
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tactical message format from a system user. A system user in
this context is an authorized system addressee who can send
and receive messages, and read from the database only; as
opposed to the system owner, who controls the KBS through the
Operator Interface. System users are the Unit Commanders and
those personnel that communicate with the system and system
owner (Intelligence Specialist) . After the Message Receive
and Filter receives the entire message text, each line is
parsed into message objects and evaluated for information
validity (consistency), timeliness, and content- or time-
urgency. Further, the message is filtered or categorized into
a request (query the system) or a certain message-type. The
Request Management functional component allows the system
owner and users to gain access to the DBMS, based on the
request code. It also logs all queries to the DBMS and KBS.
The Message Routing functional area contains the rules and
knowledge bases that determine what addressees get certain
message objects, and in what priority. The Database Manager
functional area is the actual integrated DBMS(s) of the KBS.
The system owner or users will leave the KBS and the DBMS will
fully control operations within that area. The subject of
integrated DBMS and KBS, however, is a topic for further
research. The Message Format Translator is the final
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functional area of the KBS before an external routine or
program transmits the message or request response. The
message formatting rules customized pertinent message objects
into a standard tactical message format, attaches the
addressee (s) and priority (if urgent) and calls the external
routine to send the message or request response.
The functional area interconnectivity presents the overall
system concept cf this thesis. Each functional area is
separated and discussed individually in terms of its
functional low, state-transition diagram, and a summary to
gain a better understanding of the requirements of the system.
The functional area interconnectivity diagram shows the
complete system concept in a black-bow representation. Each
functional area is presented individually, showing the inputs
and outputs on its functional flow analysis diagram (Figure
1) . The state diagrams represent the possible state the
functional areas can be in as a result of the metasystem
control
.
B. FUNCTIONAL FLOW ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
1 . Intelligence Specialist Interface
The Intelligence Specialist Interface serves as the
operator control for the KBS (see Figure 2) . By intervening
in the automatic processes, the operator retains the ultimate
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control of all system functions, for it is important to keep
the analyst in the decision loop at all times. Decisions not
to perform certain actions with information which may
ultimately affect lives and resources shall appropriately
remain the responsibility of the command and his staff (Ultra
Systems, 1987)
.
The purpose of the interface between the expert system
and the intelligence specialist is to control the operation
of all functional areas of the system through the interaction
with the expert system shell, and be provided with updated
information on a real-time basis, of all knowledge contained
in the knowledge bases. The State-transition Diagram (Figure
3) , represents the possible states that the Operator Interface
functional area can be in.
Through this interface with the KBS, the operator can
process control actions from operator input. He can perform
read and write privileges to the enemy situation database,
the friendly situation database, and the addressee database.
He has read-only privileges from the message-log and request-
log databases: these two databases provide the audit trail












































DB VIA KBS CONTROL ACTION
Figure 2. Flow Analysis for Intelligence Specialist
Interface
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Figure 3. State-transition Diagram for Intelligence
Specialist Interface
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The text output is displayed in a text window overlay.
In this way, multiple pieces of information can be
simultaneously displayed. The text will be retrieved from
any of the databases: message-log, request-log, request-
search, addressee, enemy situation, friendly situation,
intelligence-workbook, enemy order or battle, and terrain
weather
.
Primary output should be a graphic representation of
the map overlay. Standard military symbology can be used to
maintain an automated enemy situation overlay and the friendly
situation overlay. Update and bookkeeping functions would be
accomplished by the KBS without operator prompting.
2 . Message Receive and Filter
The purpose of the Message Receive and Filter is to
provide the means where all incoming messages and requests
enter the KBS (see Figure 4) . It accepts messages from the
operator as well as the system. It then parses the formatted
message into message objects, checks information for validity
based on each message object and message type, and forwards
the message objects to the knowledge base or database and
message routing. In the case of a request, the request code
is forwarded to the request manager. At any time, information
inconsistent with the rule-base or knowledge base, the system
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notifies the operator through the use of an explanation
facility via the interface. The State-transition Diagram
(Figure 5) represents the states that the Message Receive and
Filter functional area can be in.
3 . Request Manager
The Request Manager is responsible for logging all
queries for information to the system (see Figure 6) . It will
pass control to the database manager based on the appropriate
request code. If a search is found, it will generate a
response with the data from the database. It is the
metasystem that is an integral part of this module that
actually determines when to pass control to the database
manager, and what to do a search is completed. Additionally,
the metasystem passes control to the Intelligence Specialist
based on the appropriate request code. It then forwards the
responses from the DBMS to the Message Routing (Figure 7)
.
4 . DBMS
The DBMS module performs functions within the KBS but
outside the realm of metasystem control (Figure 8) . Commands
for the DBMS are unique and separate from those of the KBS.
In this way, the system coordinates functionality between the






















































Figure 4. Flow Analysis for Message Receive and Filter
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Figure 6. Flow Analysis for Request Manager
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Figure 8. Functional Flow Analysis for DBMS
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The DBMS provides information in response to requests from
field users as well as from the Intelligence Specialist. It
maintains the databases from updates posted to it by the KBS
.
The DBMS prevents modification to the message-log and request-
log; provides an audit of all operator control modifications;
provides for read-only privileges to certain data and provides
its own databases security scheme. The DBMS State-transition
Diagram (Figure 9) illustrates each state given a query to it.
5. Message Routing
The Message Routing KB-module creates a list of
addressees, or recipients from the addressee database based
on message objects, urgency rules, routing rules, and operator
input (Figure 10) . It provides for operator control of actual
recipients if it is decided that the system-generated list of
recipients should be modified. It also matches message
objects to addressees based on urgency rules, routing rules,
and operator input. Thus, only that intelligence which is
needed by each recipient will be passed. The State-transition
diagram (Figure 11) for Message Routing illustrates the
possible states of the Message Routing KB.
6. Message Format Translator
The Message Format Translator KB places information
to be sent in a proper format based on format rules and the
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message template database. It produces customized message
formats and ensures only pertinent information is reformatted
and sent to the appropriate recipients (Figure 12) . It calls
an external routine or program that transmits the entire
message. Each outgoing message is printed out in hardcopy
form in case of system failure. Automatic printing of this
routine task frees the operator to perform his qualitative
tasks. Information which cannot be formatted is presented to
the Intelligence Specialist Interface for operator control
action. The State-transition Diagram for the Message Format
Translator (Figure 13) shows each state of its operation.
C. PROBLEMS, LIMITATIONS, AND CONSTRAINTS
Problems, limitations and constraints in the current
system are listed within the categories of problems,
opportunities or directives. The following issues were
uncovered in interviews with Marine Corps intelligence
personnel from the First Marine Division.
- Performance issues, measured by the throughput of the
message-processing, based on a fixed error rate that
should approach zero percent. Those interviewed contend
that retransmission of any message should be avoided.
Any messages that have to be retransmitted due to errors
places an extra burden on those who are involved in the
transmission of the messages. Additionally, due to the
short time value of much of the tactical intelligence
gained from field units, the information from those




- Information issues, where it is either not in a form
useful to Intelligence Specialists or Commanders, is not
timely, or where irrelevant information is passed.
- Control measures in-place to ensure that intended
recipients receive all the information that is pertinent,
and that the information is received (or passed) in a
timely manner. These control issues include maintenance
of the status overlays and other bookkeeping functions
currently performed by the intelligence personnel in the
COC.
- Personnel effectiveness issues, where effective use of
personnel in the COC and in the field units is maximized.
- Service issues, that is, issues from the users
perspective concerning accuracy of intelligence received,
reliability of receiving that intelligence, and receiving
that information in a form that is useful to them.
1 . Performance Issues
The time required for sending the radio operator to
transmit and receive subsequent acknowledgement of a message
is lengthy and often unacceptable for longer or larger
messages. The term "unacceptable" is subjective, yet every
Intelligence Officer interviewed used this descriptive form.
"Unacceptable" also coincides with the author's experiences
with transmitting tactical messages.
The amount of messages that the battalion COC can
receive and evaluate, and therefore act upon, is very low due
to the manual orientation of all tasks. Those interviewed
contend that additional personnel are needed to thoroughly

















Figure 9. State-transition Diagram for DBMS
Interconnectivity
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Figure 13. State-transition Diagram for Message Format
Translator
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The response time for the battalion COC to respond to
routine requests for intelligence is extremely slow. The
current standard operating procedure is to send information
by messenger in an attempt to keep radio traffic to a minimum.
Radio traffic by doctrine is minimized in an effort to prevent
the enemy from discovering friendly radio frequencies through
signal exploitation methods.
The performance of company and battalion message-
authors in drafting messages is degraded by the use of code-
words, fatigue, time constraints, and understanding the
meaning of message formats. It has been the author's
experience, and it has been confirmed through the interviews
with intelligence personnel, that the time to draft a message
is longer in order to lookup the applicable code-words. The
time to evaluate or analyze this same message is longer for
the same reason. Additionally, in sending messages during an
actual engagement, or while on the move, is difficult because
those in the field do not always have time to stop to draft
and send a message, and perform other important tactical
tasks
.
The performance of all hands is degraded by inclement
weather due to the manual orientation of pen and paper.
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The performance of all hands is degraded by an
increased tempo of operations . Human operators can only write
and talk at a certain fixed rate in order for others to
understand their communication. Going faster and faster to
process more information in the same time period causes people
to make more mistakes.
The current system does not operate to acceptable
standards during COC displacement. Although "acceptable" is
a subjective term, all personnel interviewed acknowledged that
a significantly lessened amount of information, and in some
cases, no information, is processed during COC displacement.
The performance of Intelligence Specialists is
constrained by their ability to quickly locate information




The information, as it arrives in the battalion COC
in message format, is not always in a form useful to all
intended recipients. Most messages contain text which must
be plotted on a status board or situation map to be
understood. Further, some messages contain code-words and
references to previous messages, which must first be
referenced.
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Irrelevant information is passed in messages. Due to
the rigidity of the messages formats and abilities of radio
operators, all lines in a given message are included in the
text, even though that line may be marked as not applicable.
Additionally, not all intended recipients need the entire
message every time one is received.
The information is not received in a timely manner.
Tactical intelligence is generally useful for only a short
period of time, beyond which it no longer retains the same
importance. Field units that are unable to transmit a time-
critical message may wait too long to try retransmitting it
at a later time.
The information passed within the battalion COC is
redundant. Four or more copies are required to route to all
shops in a timely manner. The shops are the S-2
(Intelligence), S-3 (Operations), FSC (Fire Support
Coordinator) , Watch Officer, and others as required. No
mechanism exists to ensure (before routing) two units do not
report the same information, as in the case of BDA (Battle
Damage Assessment) reports.
The economy of communication assets is lowered by the
present system. Information is passed over several nets,
depending on the information and primary use of the net.
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There are separate nets for tactical reports and intelligence
reports. Present net frequencies were allocated before the
advent of computer use in communications. Nowadays, data
transmission using computers is measured in fractions of a
second.
The information contained in different intelligence
databases (journal, workbook, and notecards) is redundant and
not in a form readily useful to management. Intelligence
Specialists must manually search through their (or someone
else's) notes to retrieve information.
3. Control Issues.
The inadequate control of message routing within the
COC requires each shop obtain their own individual copy of
each message. The Watch Officer may route irrelevant
information, or fail to route relevant information to
potential recipients. The Watch Officer's intuition, aided
by some guidance from the Battalion Commander, is the only
control mechanism in place to ensure that those in need of
information receive it
.
The Watch Officer must initial all incoming and
outgoing messages to ensure he has knowledge of their content.
This control is placed here at this point in an attempt to
ensure that the Watch Officer remains appraised of the
62
situation as it develops, that all outgoing messages are in
correct format, and that information of an urgent nature is
properly handled.
Each shop maintains their own logbooks. Logbooks
contain essentially the same messages, but exist in an attempt
to maintain an audit of actions taken by each shop.
The flow of information contains excessive layers of
handling for documentation purposes. Radio operators, not
associated with any shop, receive the message and pass copies
on to each shop, plus the Watch Officer, who in turn takes
action and document their actions taken.
4. Personnel Effectiveness Issues
There is inherent decreased output with the current
manual system, which is decreased even further when the tempo
of operations escalate, due to the additional information
required fora more detailed analysis. In some cases, there
is not enough time to give a more detailed explanation even
though a more detailed explanation may be appropriate. The
intelligence personnel interviewed stated that in order to
perform all their required tasks, additional personnel would
be needed to perform the bookkeeping tasks.
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5. Service Issues
The accuracy and legibility of incoming messages is
degraded by the level of experience of the radio operators
who send and receive the messages. Communicators who do not
understand the message formats or have poor writing skills
can negatively impact information processing.
The reliability of evaluation of the information into
useful intelligence isdegraded by higher levels of operational
tempo. Intelligence Specialists do not always have adequate
time to devote greater effort towards analysis, due to
bookkeeping distractions.
The reliability of message-traffic routing within the
battalion COC degraded by an increased tempo of operations.
This accounts for the additional controls in-place in an
effort to minimize mistakes. As personnel within the COC get
busier, some of their more routine and less critical tasks are
not performed as timely as they ordinarily would be, if the
operational tempo was not has high.
The coordination between the radio operators,
Intelligence Specialists, and Watch Officer is degraded by
the level of experience and tempo of operations within the
battalion COC. Each agency must complete its own
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responsibilities, and in so doing, may not coordinate the
needs of the other agencies of the COC
.
The coordination between field units and the battalion
intelligence section is poor due to the level of effort
required for information retrieval and communication, and lack
of a clear understanding of what to ask for. Field units
generally have a need for information in a time-critical
manner, and do not desire, or simply cannot send a messenger
to the COC to obtain additional intelligence.
The flexibility of the radio operators to accurately
record or send message in nonstandard format is dependent upon
the experience level of the radio operator and intended
recipient. The radio operators are in effect only copying
messages onto paper for others to read. Code-words, technical
words and other keywords may not be understood by those who
have no need to know the content of the messages. The
messages that are recorded are sometimes difficult to read by
others, or are copied wrong by the radio operators. Each
recipient must then decode the message.
The reliability of intelligence is degraded by the
lack of detailed, up-to-date intelligence maintained for
reference by the intelligence section. Updating intelligence
on a regular basis and under all circumstances is difficult
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for the Intelligence Specialist to consistently perform, for
there are other duties which are of higher priority that also
must be performed.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to draw concrete conclusions concerning
the applicability of a knowledge-based system to integrate
the collecting, processing, and dissemination functions of
tactical intelligence in a real-time mode. However, there is
a high probability that such a project is technically
feasible; and that collecting, processing and disseminating
information can be captured in knowledge-bases. All routine
tasks should be automated, freeing the Intelligence
Specialists and Officers to perform their intuitive tasks and
qualitative decision-making . Additionally, automating message
handling and bookkeeping can eliminate the need for extra
radio operators in the Battalion COC . In doing so, however,
one must weigh the costs in terms of reliability of the
knowledge-bases, speed and dependence on automation, against
the virtues of humans performing the same tasks. Using these
factors for comparison, the option at this point tends toward
automation: structured redundant tasks would be performed in
a more consistent manner. Information distortion is likely
with multiple layers of manual processing involved. However,
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no claim can be made concerning the optimality of search of
representation of the knowledge-base at this early stage.
The commercially available expert system NEXPERT was
chosen for its fit to the adaptive design approach: it lends
itself extremely well to prototyping. A discussion of its
architectural limitations with respect to its adaptability for
field use should be a topic for further research. It does
appear feasible at this point to use NEXPERT as the expert
system of choice for a personal computer-based artificial
intelligence application for technical intelligence.
Particularly interesting were the editors that allowed ease
of knowledge entry and subsequent modification, and the
semantic networks that presented pictorial flows of objects
and rules. In effect, the domain-expert that is, the
Intelligence Specialists, may be able to be the Knowledge
Engineers, subject to their qualification as an "expert" of
NEXPERT.
Several issues arose when considering an expert system
for use in a tactical environment:
First, can an expert system be adapted to a combat
environment and remain reliable? The system must possess
significant knowledge capabilities to handle the large variety
of scenarios that will occur in the field. In constructing
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the system for this eventuality, general rules must be
constructed and the inference engine then can reason from
these "top-level" facts. Allowing the system to reason on
general rules or approximations means that goals need not be
meticulously exact (Zytkow and Erickson, 1987, p. 141) . If
new facts or new conclusions are drawn, the inference engine
must incorporate these newfound conclusions and facts into the
knowledge-base, and they must be correct.
Is it possible to maintain the system to meet the users'
demands? It is expected that as any tactical scenario
develops, different constraints will be in place at different
times. Essentially, the rules may change as the game is
played. Further research is required for the dynamic control
of these changing rules. If the rules are changing, then the
procedures which maintain their correctness and validity are
major research issues (RADC, 1986, p. 4-19). The system
should be constructed entirely of user defined choices,
constraints, and satisfiers that can be changed during the
life of the KBS . NEXPERT supports this end-user computing
through extensive use of its different editors.
This thesis effort has focused upon meta-knowledge
acquisition, organized into separate and independent modules
based on function, that can be loaded as required to control
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the system. Within this context of knowledge representation,
there were several assumptions: (1) rule-based formulation
could be used to capture the concepts and processes of "rules
about rules", (2) an object-oriented KBS accurately captures
the structure of the concepts of meta-knowledge, (3) the
control structure of the KBS reflects what the experts'
problem-solving strategies may be, (4) rules reflect
associations and methods that are either used by the experts
when solving the problem, or are understandable
rationalizations of such methods . These assumptions led to
several points:
First, meta-knowledge should be represented by separated
global and local elements, and time and event-driven elements.
The state of any of the functional areas of the system then,
is represented by the combination of object values. The
organization of the database and knowledge-base will be
considerably different in order to account for the differences
of the global and local objects, and time dependent and
independent objects. A type of organization recommended for
dealing with this problem of a large number of constraints is
the concept of frames. Frames representing components or
objects of meta-knowledge allow for competing choices (or
hypotheses) to be looked at in a top-down fashion, eliminating
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possibilities as a result of constraint violation. The
higher-level classes and then subclasses are search first,
then objects and subobjects are subsequently searched for
constraints that cannot be satisfied. Additionally, "The
portions of the knowledge-bases that are dynamic must be
maintained in a different manner than those portions that are
static." (RADC, 1986, p. 4-19)
There were three potential disadvantages that this type
of expert system might have:
- First, training the users to become proficient in NEXPERT
(but the same conclusion would likely hold true for any
robust expert system) would be difficult. Although a
recognized software engineering principle seems to
support than an expert system should be easy to learn and
easy to use, in this case a system robustness should not
be sacrificed for system ease-of-use. However, it is too
early to make a sweeping conclusion to support the use of
an unmodified NEXPERT. Any such modification, though,
must be weighed in terms of memory and response time lost
against that of maintaining proficiency of the users. A
substantial front-end investment may be required to
ensure higher system performance and productivity.
- Second, the degree of confidence that the intelligence
community places in the knowledge-base and the depth of
the knowledge-base was a concern. The size of the
potential domain in order for the system to be truly
robust might be inhibitably large for a personal computer
to handle. It is felt that the modularization and
independent organization of the rulebases alleviates this
to some degree. Still, some doubt exists as to whether
any system can handle any scenario that may occur (even
those scenarios not identified in advance)
.
However, since this system is based on independent
rulebases and modularization, it lends itself to
remedying the smaller, easier problems, one-by-one, that
in aggregrate constitute the whole problem of tactical
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intelligence flow. Prototyping each task incrementally
and then combining each smaller remedy solves the larger
problem. The system, therefore, does not have to provide
the whole solution before implementation. Solving each
of the component problems, i.e., that of maintaing
logbooks, and keeping the enemy situation updated, in
turn provides the solution of using the expert system for
intelligence personnel in a tactical environment. In the
end though, users must be confidently convinced that the
system provides an advantage over the other alternatives.
(Fick, 1980, p. 139)
- Third, to the extent that building any expert system is
still experimental (Hayes-Roth et al
.
, 1983, p. 154), it
is too early to predict any success in operational terms,
of such a proposed system for two reasons: knowledge
acquisition and knowledge revision.
Knowledge acquisition and revision are of primary concern
in future development of this system. Given that the
inference engine should be transparent to the user, the domain
expert, nonetheless, must still be able to change the rules
during operational use. Formalization of knowledge
acquisition for a system of this scope requires further
development coupled with extensive user involvement. Using
NEXPERT with its rule-editor, object-editor, and metaslot-
editor, knowledge can be quickly and easily organized to
promote prototyping. The advantages of such knowledge-base
(KB) editors are: (1) They facilitate the task of entering
knowledge into the system, (2) they automate bookkeeping
functions and allow the knowledge engineer to concentrate on
his qualitative tasks, (3) they help the user to avoid
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typographic and syntactic errors and, (4) they check for
semantic inconsistencies (Hayes-Roth et al
.
, 1983, p. 149).
These advantages can be realized in a field environment
whereby the domain expert (Intelligence Specialist)
essentially becomes the knowledge engineer. The use of the
KB-editors is another area for further effort.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
Building the prototype appears to be the next step in
creating the system for tactical use. Prototyping in NEXPERT,
however, will require extensive efforts in the areas of
knowledge acquisition, use of NEXPERT itself, and interface
with the chosen external programs and routines
.
In attempting to build a version-0 prototype, organizing
the classes, objects and rules into components or frames
offers an approach that works with NEXPERT. NEXPERT itself,
is frame-based and object-oriented. A frame is a collection
of facts; the abstraction of an object or set(s) of objects
(Rowe, 1986, p. 286) . NEXPERT will perform all the
bookkeeping functions and by incrementally compiling every
new object and rule, provides for error-checking. Each object
will get a separate frame with slots in the frame to represent
its properties (and properties receive values) , and for the
whole whose values are pointers to that frame or object.
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There are several advantages to frame representation of
objects: (1) Frames distinguish properties of components not
shared by the whole class, (2) frames describe relationships
of the objects to one another, like the relative location of
parts of a physical object or the relative time of subevents
of an action, (3) frames distinguish multiple of optional
occurrences of an object, whose variation is described by
qualifying properties and, (4) frames can be generated for
different levels of objects: frames for objects describe
subobjects in property-slots, and-so-on (Rowe, 1986, p. 286).
The slots can also be procedural that represent instructions
or sets of instructions to be carried out. Filled slots
represent facts, or properties. These slots can then be the
object of another frame. For the user who may be called upon
to create and delete objects and manipulate slots within the
frames during an operational exercise, there may be an
advantage of frame representation in organizing and displaying
new information. NEXPERT' s KB-editors provide an easy
interface to modify the KBS as necessary. This feature is
particularly helpful during initial loading of the knowledge-
bases, since it is predicted that an extensive amount of rules
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and objects are needed. The recommendation, then, is to







Central to a military information system that is expected
to operate under conditions where data integrity is crucial
to success, and where vulnerability reduces that success
potential dramatically, is computer security. Four central
themes establish the baseline for the discussion of computer
security for the intelligence integrated information system:
First, the system is designed to operation in a hostile
environment. The objective is total database security based
on the assumption that the enemy will definitely devote
considerable effort to interception and disruption. The enemy
must be denied access to the databases at all times.
Therefore, proposing countermeasures to decrease the
probability of threat is inappropriate alone. Several
security countermeasures integrated together and used
multipliciously should be independently evaluated.
Individually, countermeasures decrease probabilities of
threat; collectively, they must deny.
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Second, the major security concern is protecting
information from leaking to the enemy. Protection from
unauthorized use from internal sources during combat should
not be a significant factor in the design of an appropriate
security scheme. Further, multilevel security may be breached
in a life-threatening situation. For example, the author
contends if the value of the information will save lives, then
the level of security for that information should be
disregarded and the information disseminated to those whose
lives depend on knowing that information.
Third, it is doctrinal ly appropriate for threat analysis
and identification of countermeasures to be the responsibility
of the Counterintelligence Officer of Intelligence Officer
performing counterintelligence functions.
Fourth, there are six fundamental requirements to provide
for controlled access to information and assurances that must
be accomplished in a trusted computer system: (1) There must
be an explicitly and well-defined security policy enforced by
the system. (2) Access control labels must be associated
with all objects. It must be possible to mark every object
with a label that reliably identifies the object's
classification level of the modes of access granted to
subjects who may potentially access the object. (3)
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Individual subjects must be identified. (4) Audit
information must be selectively kept and protected so that
actions affecting security can be traced to the responsible
part. (5) The computer system must contain mechanisms, both
hardware and software, that can be evaluated independently to
assure that the system enforces requirements through the other
requirements. (6) The trusted mechanisms that enforce the
basic requirements must always be protected from tampering.
B. PROTECTION SCHEME
Proceeding on the premise that security should be designed
into the system and not added on as an afterthought, a
tactical information system designed for use at battalion
level needs a discussion of the security dimension before any
system model is considered complete. Unique issues confront
such a military system that is designed to always operate in
a hostile environment.
It is recognized that system security requirements must
meet with the Department of Defense Standard System Evaluation
Criteria. A class C2, Controlled Access Protection is
appropriate for this type of system. This class of protection
scheme is intended for those dedicated mode systems operating
in a closed environment. It offers the minimum accepted
standards that a class C2 must possess:
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Discretionary access control. This mechanism provides
that objects be protected from unauthorized access.
Object reuse. No information produced by one user is
available to another user that obtains access to that
object
.
Identification and authentication. Users must identify
themselves before beginning any actions the trusted
computer base (TCB) is expected to control.
Authentication data will be protected so that it cannot
be accessed by unauthorized users.
Audit. The TCB will create and maintain an audit trail
of accessed to objects it protects. This audit trail
will be protected from modification, unauthorized access
and destruction. (DOD 5200.28-STD, 1985, pp. 15-18)
C. SECURITY CATEGORIES
In attaining that level of protection of security
required, security in the following categories are discussed:
operating environment, physical security, communication
security, data security.
1 . Operating Environment Security
Physical security measures and operational procedures
can be emplaced to significantly limit any access (Hsiao, Kerr
and Madnick, 1979, p. 47) to the system. The first step,
however, is to define the set of authorized users and the
operating environment. The operating environment has already
been defined as the battlefield. The set of authorized users
are: those officers and men who have a need-to-know to either
(1) send tactical messages, (2) receive tactical messages and
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(3) receive tactical intelligence on the status of either the
enemy or friendly situation. Authority to grant user
privileges should rest with the owner of the database, and a
hierarchal scheme defined. Normally, the battalion commander
owns the database. The user list includes company commanders
and their radio operators, unit commanders, platoon
commanders, company executive officers, and others
specifically designated by their respective commanders. Those
within the command post include the Battalion Commander,
Battalion Executive Offier, Operations Officer, Watch
Officers, Intelligence Officer, and the Intelligence
Specialists. The user group just defined is extremely small,
therefore, it would be appropriate to implement this system
as a closed environment. A closed environment, with its few
authorized users, provides a high degree of physical security
(Hsiao et al
.
, 1979, p. 48). A limitation of this
implementation concerns the impact of the availability of the
system if the authorized users become casualties in combat,
and the opportunity for training for those not designated
prior to the outset of system operation.
2 . Physical Security
The threat to the physical security of the computer
system operation is natural disaster. It does not include
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theft or tampering. Natural disaster in the context of
military considerations needs further clarification. It is
considered to include the elements of nature, such as rain
and temperature, that impact on the computer hardware
operation; and the power source required for maintaining
system operations. The countermeasures available to protect
the computer system from natural disaster include a reliable
computer and encasement, and a continuous power supply.
Computers chosen for tactical use must be capable of
operation in any climate and weather. Additionally, it should
be expected that rough handling would be the treatment norm.
The feasibility of fielding such equipment is proven with
similar systems already in place.
Power supply is also considered a countermeasure
.
Disruption of the power source would significantly affect the
operation of any computer. For the Marine Corps, normal
electrical power is supplied to the command post by a diesel
generator located a short distance away and connected via
cable. The author opines this source is unacceptable as a
power source for computers. For tactical considerations, its
signature is audible for quite a distance. It is highly
unreliable, with frequent power surges and outages. An
alternative is battery power. Use of batteries ensures the
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portability of the computer for routine COC displacement and
in case of a hasty relocation. Also, the computer would not
be dependent on the reliability of the diesel generator. "As
the reliability of computers has pushed above the 99 percent
mark, the most common cause of equipment outage has become
power failure." (Carroll, 1987, p. 117)
However, these countermeasures contain limitations.
In any military system that requires a power source for
operation, the transport of that power supply is a logistic
nuisance. A unique battery-pack or generator, used only for
the computers, should not be used for that very reason.
Instead, the standard batteries used with current FM radios
should be used. Each battery can deliver up to six hours of
continuous operation (with the radios) . Configuring computers
to accept that as the power source would be a plus for those
who have to man-carry such gear.
Authentication and Identification threats also exist
under the category of Physical Security. Appropriate
countermeasures to overcome this threat are passwords, keys,
and handshaking. A combination of passwords and handshaking
should be used. It is probably this intrusion point that is
the most vulnerable to attack, and most likely to be attacked.
Interception of communications is a favorite enemy collection
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method (FMFM 2-1, 1980, p. 101), and the enemy must first
penetrate the system in order to access data or intercept
messages. Since callsigns that are already in use are
classified information, and their distribution limited, their
use as passwords can be considered. For example, Company A'
s
callsign for a period of time may be R2B; therefore, Company
A' s password would also be R2B. However, passwords alone are
not enough (Chalmers, 1986, p. 73).
Further discussion must include mechanisms to detect
instances when an intruder is attempting to access the system.
An interrupt or flag can alert the system security officers
if a predetermined threshold of entry attempts is exceeded.
Handshaking is considered a counter-countermeasure . In the
event of entry into the system via the correct password, but
under suspected methods or circumstances, the user must
provide a series of passwords or pass-statements to an
algorithm even though the user doesn't know the algorithm
(Hsiao et al
.
, 1979, p. 98). The algorithms, like passwords,
must be changed at frequent intervals and be protected. Also,
individual algorithms for each different user should be
considered.
There are limitations to using keys and having
passwords. Keys, although normally considered a
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countermeasure contributor in most literature, should not be
used in a combat environment, if it is a key that is carried.
Its loss not only compromises the key, but implies that the
authorized user could not gain access. This occurrence could
happen when the user most needs urgent communication.
Passwords can be compromised by loss or unauthorized
distribution. Additionally, they must be changed frequently.
3 . Communication Security
The threat to communication security is transmission
security, that is, ensuring that all transmission remain
secure. Countermeasures to oppose this threat include
cryptographic transformation and meditation certification.
Cryptographic transformations are techniques for
encoding data to hide their content in the course of
communications in the network (Hsiao et al
.
, 1979, p. 135) .
Cryptographic techniques for secure telecommunications can be
applied throughout the network, including line encryption.
Since all data transmitted through an otherwise unsecured net
is encrypted, it is considered secure (Gilhooley, 1980, pp.
33-56)
. To penetrate an encrypted transmission, an enemy must
have a high work factor value. The work factor depends on the
amount of encrypted text available and the time it takes to
break the cipher (Carroll, 1987, p. 175). The value is
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reduced by cryptographic systems in which the key is readily
apparent; systems that infrequently change keys; availability
of cryptographic devices, program and keying data to the
enemy; malfunction of cryptographic equipment; and poor
security practices on the part of the users (Carroll, 1987,
p. 182) .
The mode of operation for the terminals should be the
transaction mode (Carroll, 1987, p. 167). In this mode, the
user is constrained to work only within the confines of the
specific application program. In order to do this, the program
should have two main characteristics: mediation and
certification
.
Every input should be mediated in such a way that it
is checked for validity before being passed to the central
computer. This is called mediation. For such a tactical
system, validation may include checking for anticipated input
errors, consistency in message information and data requests,
and parity checks. Mediation means that only permissible,
certified commands will be allowed to enter the computer
(Carroll, 1987, p. 167)
.
Every permissible command and every permissible
sequence of commands should have a predictable and acceptable
response. This is referred to as certification. No
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modification of the applications program or operating system,
or database should result. (Carroll, 1987, p. 168) For
example, a mechanism emplaced may allow only an APPEND data
to be acceptable.
The limitation of mediation and certification may
include limiting the set of allowable commands. However, in
doing this, the power of the DBMS may be severely limited.
Cryptographic transformation offers a flexible and
secure means of data security. If the use of keys are used
to determine the ciphers, and these keys must be carried, it
is anticipated that the keys can be compromised by loss.
4 . Data Security
The threat to data security is passing value-sensitive
information to unauthorized recipients. Countermeasures that
lessen this threat are view mechanisms and query modification.
Access decisions to a tactical database should be
based on value-sensitive information and state-sensitive
information. Value-sensitive information is context-
independent and is based on the current value of the data
(Hsiao et al . , 1979, p. 224). For example, to prevent
"information overload" (which can be viewed as an independent
consideration in addition to security) to a Battalion
Commander, a value-sensitizing information mechanism would
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ensure that users could only view pertinent information
specific to that battalion, and other criteria established in
the design of the database.
State-sensitive information is also context-
independent information in which the dynamic state of the
database management system plays a role (Hsiao et al
.
, 1979,
p. 224) . If a suspected intruder is attempting to access a
file (perhaps identified through the handshaking mechanism)
,
the Intelligence Officer, as owner of the systems, places it
in a locked state to prevent files from being accessed.
View mechanisms makes the user see only what they need
to know. Attribute information called schemas are provided
access control by subschemas. Different subschemas may be
assigned for different users (Hsiao et al
.
, 1979, p. 226)
.
Query modification disallows user access to
information by modifying any query that attempts to gain
access (Hsiao et al . , 1979, p. 227) to information that a user
is not authorized to view. Again, the user only gets to see
data on a need-to-know basis.
An added benefit of these security countermeasures is
that the unit commander views only what would be pertinent.
Extraneous data from the database would be filtered and would
be prevented from being viewed. Remember, the user may be in
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actual combat and may not have time to browse through data.
Both view mechanisms and query modification not only protect
the commander from unnecessary information retrieval, but more
importantly, limit the amount of compromise sustained.
Allowing only certain information to be viewed or
accessed by a user may prevent that user from obtaining that
one piece of data that is needed. Additionally, all
commanders want to personally pick and choose which
information is or is not needed; it is not likely that
commanders rely on a computer to make sure important decisions
of that type.
Another threat to data security is the accessibility
of the actual data. Countermeasures to restrict data access
include partitioning, compartmentalization, the security atom
concept, and improving access precision.
Once an access decision is made by the DBMS, requested
data will actually be accessed. A goal of the system is that
of absolute precision, which means every piece of data
accessed is a piece of data requested (Hsiao et al
.
, 1979, p.
233) . However, the "pass-through problem occurs when the
DBMS, in order to get certain data, must access some other
data which have different protection requirements." (Hsiao et
al . , 1979, p. 235) If the database is partitioned into
88
groups, and if the DBMS knows the security property of each
group, then the system will go access the records of those
groups directly whose security properties do not deny the
request (Hsiao et al
.
, 1979, p. 236).
The security atom concept compartmentalizes the
database into partitions. By assigning different protection
attributes to different security atoms, the records of an atom
are protected uniformly (Hsiao et al
.
, 1979, p. 236). Such
a concept is appropriate for tactical use for two reasons:
(1) denial of information from the enemy, and, (2) prevention
of other friendly forces from gaining access to information
which does not contribute to the mission accomplishment. Here
the security atom usage is quite unique. The expected
protection concept implies that a proper clearance would be
required in order to view the atom. For tactical use, where
the level of security is not the mechanism that determines
access, the security atom protects the information nonetheless
on a need-to-know criteria.
5. Conclusion
Designing security into a system model for further
development must be exhaustive. Security of information
should be a primary focus of a tactical database. The
considerations for employment of security concepts, with their
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possible limitations have been presented as independent
modules to incorporate into the design of the DBMS functional
area of the KBS . No greater emphasis is placed on one area
than another, for concentrating efforts in one area leaves
gaping holes elsewhere (Gilhooley, 1980, p. 35) . Independent
modularity of countermeasure implementation ensures a layered
security protection scheme that only a sophisticated,
dedicated, and resource-rich enemy is likely to penetrate and
exploit. This author opines that immediate tactical
information is of lesser importance than strategic
intelligence. tactical information tends to be useful for
only a short period of time. This short time value of data
concept allows for a less vigorous protection scheme. The
security issue should focus on the length of time that the
data must be denied to the enemy. Before a tactical database
is built, the concepts of computer security must be mapped
into the specific implementation scheme, and will form the
basis for doctrine when the system is operational.
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